Battle of Plataea

For the battle of the Lamian War, see Battle of Plataea (323 BC).

Battle of Plataea
Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greece
Persians and Spartans fighting at Plataea. 19th century illustration.
Date August 479 BC Location Plataea, Greece Result Greek victory Territorial changes Persia loses control of Attica and Boeotia
Belligerents
Greek city-states Sparta Athens Corinth Megara	Achaemenid Empire Greek vassals:  • Boeotia  • Thessalia  • Macedon
Commanders and leaders
Pausanias Amompharetus † Arimnestos Aristides Olympiodoros	Mardonius † Masistius † Artabazos
Strength
c. 75,000–85,000 (modern consensus)	c. 100,000 (modern consensus)
Casualties and losses
Low thousands (modern consensus)	Five to ten times the losses of the Greeks (modern consensus)

The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479 BC near the city of Plataea in Boeotia, and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states (including Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara), and the Achaemenid Empire of Xerxes I (allied with Greek states including Boeotia, Thessalia, and Macedon).

The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by the Persian king Xerxes I in person, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and conquered the regions of Thessaly, Phocis, Boeotia, Athens, Euboea and Attica. However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of the Peloponnesus region. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled a huge army and marched out of the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime terrain for cavalry around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days. While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle line fragmented. Thinking that the Greeks were in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks, particularly the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius.

A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in its camp and killed. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale, the Greek allies would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.

Background

Main articles: First Persian invasion of Greece and Second Persian invasion of Greece

The Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes I, on his accession quickly initiated his preparations for an invasion of Greece, including the task of building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met, probably at Corinth, in 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed, generally referred to as the Allies.

In August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes' approach, a small Allied army led by Spartan King Leonidas I blocked the pass of Thermopylae. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae for three days before being outflanked by the Persians, who used a little-known mountain path. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack Plataea and Thespiae, the Boeotian cities that had not surrendered, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth. The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis in 480 BC ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Sardis with a minor portion of his army.

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle.

The Achaemenid Empire and its allied Greek states: Macedonia, Thessaly, Malis, Locris, Phocis and Boeotia; at the time of the Battle of Plataea.

Xerxes left Mardonius with the charge of his troops. Mardonius decided to spend the winter in Thessaly. Mardonius tried to win over the Athenians and their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon. Upon their refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the enemy, leading to the second phase of the Destruction of Athens. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees in Salamis. Athens sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance and threatened to accept the Persian terms if it was not provided. These events occurred sometime in the month of June. According to Herodotus, the Spartans were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, and delayed making a decision for ten days, until they were persuaded of the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.

Prelude

Movements of the Persian and Greek armies in 480–479 BC.

When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force marching to join the allied Greek army, he completed the destruction of Athens, tearing down whatever was left standing. He then retreated towards Boeotia, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory that would be advantageous for the Persian cavalry. Mardonius withdrew from Attica through the Decelea defile, passed by Sphendale, encamped for a night at Tanagra and then marched to Skolos. Mardonius built a fortified encampment around 1.9 square kilometres (0.73 sq mi) in area on the north bank of the Asopos river in Boeotia, thus covering the ground from Erythres past Hysiae and up to the lands of Plataea.

The Athenians under the command of Aristides joined the Allied army at Eleusis in Attica. The army traveled on the Oenoe road via Panactum, the plains of Skourta and the eastern Pastra mountain, across the passes of Mount Cithaeron and arrived near Plataea. The archaeologist Andreas Konecny estimates that the crossing of Cithaeron would have taken place sometime between late July and mid August. Under the guidance of their commanding general, Pausanias, the Greeks took up positions opposite the Persian lines but remained on high ground. They deployed their lines from Erythrai to Hysiai, and from their positions on the Cithaeron could observe the Persian lines 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) across the Asopos river. The Greek units were camped in order of their positions in the phalanx, so that the formation could be set up easily at the start of battle.

Mardonius initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines. During a reconnaissance patrol, the Persians had noticed a gap in the Greek lines on the western flank. At the foot of a cliff, the Megarians were deployed in terrain accessible to the Persian cavalry, about 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) from the westernmost point of the line. The Megarian line was about 400 metres (1,300 ft) wide at the front, of this frontage, about 250 metres (820 ft) was exposed. The Persian cavalry under the command of Masistius began attacking in continuous waves. Konecny estimates that hundreds of cavaliers would have been required to attack in each wave. The Megarians requested reinforcements and said they would retreat if these were not sent.

300 Athenians, hoplites or infantry, along with their archers replaced the Megarians at the spot where the Persian cavalry was attacking. These Athenians were commanded by Olympiodoros. The Athenians formed a single or double line formation, and from their rear their archers fired their volleys. An Athenian archer managed to hit Masistius' horse when the latter was on the frontline opposite the Athenians. Masistius was flung off his horse and landed near the Athenian line, where the soldiers started stabbing him but were unable to kill him as he was wearing scale corslet armor underneath his clothes. Masistius was finally killed when an Athenian soldier stabbed him in the eye. The Persians tried with much effort to recover his body but were pushed back by the Greek infantry, which had just arrived to reinforce the Athenians. The Persian cavalry retreated soon after.

View of the battlefield from above. The battle took place on the hilly plain between the Asopos river (top) and Plataea (center right).

The battlefield of Plataea seen from the south, i.e. from the hills of the Cithaeron Range. Modern city of Plataies, near the ruins of old Plataea slightly beyond.

Masistius' body was paraded on a cart in front of the Greek lines. Their morale boosted by this small victory, the Greeks moved forward, still remaining on higher ground, to a new position near the Asopos river which was more defensible and better watered. In response, Mardonius brought his men westward up to the Asopos and arrayed them for battle in a line 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) long. However, neither the Persians nor the Greeks would attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides had received bad omens from their seers. Konecny argues that this is because both of them were waiting for their opponent to attack first. The armies thus stayed camped in their locations for eight days.

On the eighth day after the arrival of the Persian and Greek armies at Plataea, heeding the advice of a Theban named Timagenes, Mardonius set up a lookout on the passes of Mount Cithaeron. At night on the same day, Mardonius dispatched his cavalry to attack a Greek supply convoy, which resulted in the Greek supply lines being halted. The Greeks were attacked by the Persian cavalry for the next two days. He launched another cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army, as they could not draw from the Asopos due to the threat posed by Persian archers.

The initial movements at the Battle of Plataea. The Greek line moves forward to the Asopos ridge.

The Greeks had now been encamped at their second position for 12 days. Coupled with the lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water. To prevent the Persian cavalry from attacking during the retreat, it was to be performed that night. The position the Greeks chose for their retreat was named the "island", at a distance of 1.8 kilometres (1.1 mi) from both the Asopos river and the Gargaphian spring. During the day chosen for the retreat, the Greeks underwent constant attacks by the Persian cavalry. Meanwhile, the Persians were considering a retreat to Thebes where they had "already stored a great deal of food, as well as fodder for the pack animals."

However, the retreat went awry. The Allied contingents in the centre began their movement late at night, and perhaps because they were not aware of the new terrain, ended up advancing 1.8 kilometres (1.1 mi) past the island to arrive at the Temple of Hera. The Tegeans and Spartans on the right wing were chosen to advance to the Cithaeron passes and accompany the stuck supply convoys to the new Greek position. However, these units had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. This was because a Spartan commander, Amompharetus, refused to retreat because he thought it would be cowardly. While the rest of the Spartans retreated, his lochos was left behind.

The death of Masistius in early skirmishes.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Plataeans had also been unable to retreat, because their path had been blocked by the scattered centre. The Athenians sent a messenger to Pausanias asking for his new directive. Pausanias asked the Athenians to retreat to the Cithaeron passes and not to the "island", and join up with the Spartans if possible. This message was received before daybreak but the Athenians began moving only after dawn. Konecny posits that Aristides may have wanted to avoid the chaos of nighttime movements. Pausanias then marched 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) to the north of modern Erythres, and the Greeks of the scattered center started to converge on his position, though the latter would have taken longer to get into formation. Pausanias' two units, however, were the first ones ready for contact when the Persian cavalry arrived.

The Persian cavalry had begun to mobilize for attacking by this time. However, because Amompharetus and his unit were still in their line of sight, they did not rush, perhaps thinking that all of their opponent's army was just ahead of Amompharetus' unit. This allowed Pausanias to execute his retreat safely, and gave Amompharetus enough time to withdraw. When the Persian cavalry arrived at the Greek position, they found it decamped and conveyed this information to Mardonius through a messenger.

Order of battle

Greeks

The Spartan general Pausanias commanded the Allied Greek troops.

According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men – 5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites (perioeci) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate). Pausanias, the regent for his cousin Pleistarchus, was chosen to command the Spartan troops. The historian Ian Macgregor-Morris argues that the 5,000 Spartiates sent to Plataea would have been 3/5th of Sparta's troops, while the historian Hans van Wees argues that these 5,000 would have been all the Spartan citizens fit to serve. The Spartan troops at Plataea might have been the largest army the Spartans had sent beyond the Isthmus of Corinth. Pausanias chose Euryanax to be his deputy commander. The Greek army was also reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states.

The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that Herodotus had assumed that each Greek hoplite was accompanied by a lightly armed attendant from the ranks of the psiloi, which had led to Herodotus inflating his numbers for the allied Greek army to 110,000. Sekunda argues that these attendants were present in the Greek camp but not on the battlefield. He further argues that these attendants served as skeuphoros (baggage carriers), and were either slaves or the relatives of the hoplites too young to serve in the military.

City		City		City	Number of hoplites
Sparta	10,000	Athens	8,000	Corinth	5,000
Megara	3,000	Sicyon	3,000	Tegea	1,500
Phlius	1,000	Troezen	1,000	Anactorion & Leukas	800
Epidaurus	800	Arcadian Orchomenans, Arcadians	600	Eretria & Styra	600
Plataea	600	Aegina	500	Ambracia	500
Chalcis	400	Mycenae & Tiryns	400	Hermione	300
Potidaea	300	Cephalonia	200	Lepreum	200
Source:				Total	38,700

Achaemenids

Main Achaemenid troops under Mardonius

Persians

Medians

Sakas

Bactrians

Indians

Main troops of Achaemenid general Mardonius, according to Herodotus: Persians, Medians, Sakas, Bactrians and Indians, illustrated in the list of troops by ethnicity, on the tomb of Xerxes I at Naqsh-e Rostam.

The historian John Francis Lazenby, by comparing the size of the Persian camp with later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry. The historian Peter Connolly arrives at a potential total of 120,000 from the same-sized camp. Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. The historian Hans Delbrück, basing his calculations on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other non-combatants. In his battle account of Plataea, Delbrück estimated that the Persian army, including the allied Greeks, had totaled 40,000. Konecny estimates that Persians would have had around 55 to 70 thousand infantry, and their camps would have had anywhere from 120 to 150 thousand people including the camp followers.

Nations under the Achaemenids at Plataea	Number
Persians	40,000
Bactrians, Indians, Sakae	20,000
Greek allies: Boeotians (Thebans), Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians (1000 men), Macedonians	20,000
Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians, Egyptians	Smaller contingents
Cavalry: Persians, Bactrians, Indians, Sakae	5,000
Total	100,000

Composition and order of battle

The details of the arrangement of the Persian line were given by Herodotus. The Persians were on the left wing, facing the 11,500 Lacedaemonian and Tegean hoplites. Konecny estimates that these Persians on the left wing would have numbered around 20,000 to 30,000. To the right of the Persians were the Medes, facing the 6,200 soldiers of Corinth, Potidaea, Orchomenus and Sicyon. Konecny estimates that these Medes would have numbered around 12,000 to 18,000.

Disposition of Achaemenid troops beyond the Asopos river at the beginning of the Battle of Plataea. From left to right: Greek allies, Sacae, Indians, Bactrians, Medes and Persians.

Next to the Medes, the Bactrians were deployed in front of the 3,400 soldiers of Epidaurus, Troezen, Lepreum, Tiryns, Mycenae, and Phlius. Konecny estimates that these Bactrians would have totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. After the Bactrians were the Indians and Sacae, opposite the 3,300 soldiers of Hermione, Eretria, Styra, Chalcis, Anaktoria, Leucadia, Palea, and Aegina. Konecny estimates that these Indians and Sace would have totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. The Medes, Bactrians, Indians and Sacae formed the center of the Persian line, numbering around 24,000 to 36,000. Against the 11,600 Athenians, Plataeans and Megarians, were deployed the Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, and the Phocians. Konecny estimates that these troops would have numbered around 11,000 to 13,000. Thus the total Persian infantry would have numbered around 44,000 to 66,000; and the Persian cavalry around 5,000 to 7,000.

Logistics and finance

Aristides, commander of the Athenians, receives Alexander I of Macedon (a nominal ally of the Achaemenids) on the night before the battle.

Andreas Konecny estimates that the Greek supply train destroyed by the Persian cavalry would have had 120 tons of supplies. He estimates that the Greek army at Plataea had a total of 78,000 soldiers and that these supplies would have lasted for two days, if each soldier were to receive one choinix of rations per day, equivalent to 800 grams (1.8 lb). Konecny estimates that each column would have had to travel 75 kilometres (47 mi) one way, and argues that there would have been three supply columns in transit at all times in order to supply the Greek army. He argues that at least 500 people would have accompanied each column, and that thus a minimum of 2,000 auxiliaries had arrived at the Greek camp since four columns had already supplied them, and that at least 1,500 auxiliaries would always have to be travelling on the supply lines.

The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that the animals in the supply column would have been pack animals and not oxen, and says that the Persians could only have taken pack animals with them after the attack, since oxen could not have traversed the unpaved route. Sekunda estimates that the food provisions would be at least one choinix per day for both the Greek and Persian soldiers. Sekunda also estimates that the supply column disrupted by the Persians would have had either 58,000 choinikes of barley or 47,000 choinikes of wheat, half the daily provisions for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp, including the non-combatants.

Sekunda argues that the Greeks would have had a "common treasury", noting Plutarch's statement that during the Spartan command of the allied Greeks, the latter would pay some type of contribution. The historian Peter Brunt argues that such a treasury would not have existed. Sekunda argues that the Spartans might have had enough time to make financial provisions during the Persian invasions. Based on his estimates for the daily victual provisions, Sekunda estimates that the daily spending on rations by the Greeks would have been 10,000 drachmas. He argues that the allied Greeks could have arranged such sums. Sekunda observes that the battle of Plataea was the first instance of a Greek army receiving supplies on the battlefield, instead of living off the land, getting supplies from allied polities on their route or buying from markets set up by camp followers.

The battlefield of Plataea from the Achaemenid (northern) side.

Konecny argues that the Spartans had thus mobilized almost all of their fighting age helots to assist with the logistical problems posed by such a large Greek army. He argues that only 10,000 helots would have been deployed for combat, with the remaining 25,000 helots working the supply lines. He further claims that if all the 35,000 helots had been on the battlefield, the Greeks wouldn't have been able to form their phalanxes before the first Persian charge. Konecny estimates that during Mardonius' march to Skolos he had traveled around 70 kilometres (43 mi) from Athens in two days, while most of his army would have taken around a week.

Konecny estimates that the allied Greek army would have required 300,000 liters (79,000 U.S. gal) of water daily. The mountain slopes they had deployed on did not have access to freshwater, and carrying such quantities daily would have been logistically difficult and would have made them highly vulnerable to attacks by Persian cavalry. Sekunda estimates the daily water requirement at 250,000 liters (66,000 U.S. gal) for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp based on a daily requirement of 2.27 liters (0.60 U.S. gal) per person. However, these figures do not account for the water requirements of the animals in the Greek camp.

Battle

Pausanias offering sacrifices to the gods before the battle.

During the retreat of the Greeks on the 13th day after their arrival, all of their center wing left the field while their right wing initially did not budge. The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge to join them. Konecny argues that the Spartans had already had Amompharetus' lochos in their formation when the first units of the Persian cavalry had started attacking. Konecny estimates that Pausanias' line with 11,500 soldiers would have been 1.3 kilometres (0.81 mi) to 1.45 kilometres (0.90 mi) long, assuming there were 8 soldiers per column who each took up 0.8 metres (2.6 ft) to 1 metre (3.3 ft) of space. Pausanias asked the Athenians to reinforce his troops, but the latter had been engaged by the phalanx of the Thebans and Mardonius' Greeks, and were unable to assist Pausanias. Konijnendijk argues that the Spartans' flank had been attacked by the Persians, and notes that Pausanias had asked the Athenians to deploy their archers, who were tactically needed against the Persian archers and missileers, if they could not deploy all of their army.

Meanwhile, Mardonius had learned of the Greek retreat and rushed to Pausanias' position with the Persian left wing he was personally commanding. They had marched around 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) from their camp behind the Asopos river to the Argiopios. The Greeks had put up their shields at their front line and were fighting the Persian cavalry. The Persians were not advancing in a formation but managed to form their lines opposite the Greek phalanx. Konecny argues that the distance between both fronts might have been 50 metres (160 ft) to 70 metres (230 ft). Another estimate for the distance between the Greek and Persian lines is 100 metres (330 ft) to 150 metres (490 ft). By now, the Persians had formed their shield wall and their archers continued to fire while covered behind it. The Persian Immortals would have ten soldiers in each column, with those on the front of the line being sparabara wearing scaled iron corslets, armed with spears, bows and shields. The nine soldiers to the rear would have bows and spears, or axes.

Scene of the Battle of Plataea. 19th century illustration.

According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance because he was waiting for good omens. At this point, as Greek soldiers began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines. Pausanias finally received favourable omens and ordered the Spartans to also charge the Persian lines. Konecny argues that the Persian arrow volleys would have been dispiriting for the Greeks, since their arrows would have managed to hit undefended gaps and body parts.

The Spartans and Tegeans had started to push into the Persian lines. The Greeks started thrusting their spears at the Persian shield wall, and some of them tried to break the Persians' shields. The Persians put aside their bows and tried to break the Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but failed. At this point, the hoplites might have closed the distances between each other and huddled together tightly. They started pushing against the Persians who were risking asphyxiation because they were not accustomed to such fighting. The Persians may have stepped back a little and sent small groups to attack portions of the Greek line, in order to make them withdraw from the contingent that was pushing forward. Artabazos, who had earlier commanded the Persians at the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea, had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks, and had not fully engaged the forces under his command. As the rout commenced, he led these men away from the battlefield to Phocis, hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont.

Scene of the Battle of Plataea on the south frieze of the Temple of Athena Nike, Athens. The scene on the right may show the fight over the body of Masistius. British Museum, London.

Konijnendijk argues that the Greeks would have formed an open phalanx and not a closed one. He argues that the Spartans then formed a defensive line, thus pulling the Persians in towards them. He argues that the continuing use of ballistic weapons and small clashes along the lines would have reduced numbers on both sides, however, the Greeks did not break ranks and retreat. Meanwhile, the Spartans had outnumbered the Persians guarding Mardonius. Konijnendijk argues that these Persians would have inflicted many casualties on the Spartans till Arimnestos, a soldier, hurled a stone at Mardonius and killed him.

Mardonius' death hit the morale of his guards, and once they broke their lines and retreated, the rest of the Persian army did so too. However, the Athenians still had to fight the Thebans who were blocking them, eventually the Thebans retreated and the Persian cavalry did not let the Greeks pursue and outflank the rest of the retreating Persian army. Konijnendijk argues that it is puzzling that these cavaliers did not participate in the fight fully at this point, and notes that perhaps they were following standard Persian cavalry tactics. However, the Greeks managed to catch up with the retreating Persians and took their camp after some struggle.

The main phase of the battle at Plataea. The Greek retreat becomes disorganised, and the Persians cross the Asopus to attack.

The historian Robert Gaebel argues that the Persian cavalry who had covered the retreat of the Persian army were actually Boiotian cavalry, particularly the Theban cavalry led by Asopodoros, the son of Timandros. Gaebel observes that Herodotus had written about these cavalry units attacking the Greek center and inflicting 600 casualties on them, while the Thebans had suffered 300 casualties during this attack. Gaebel estimates that the Greek center would have had 3,500 to 4,000 soldiers, while the Theban cavalry would have had at most 1,000 soldiers. Gaebel argues that the Thebans managed to inflict disproportionate casualties on the Greek center because the latter had not formed their phalanx and were running astray. Gaebel notes that the Megarians had already been attacked successfully by Persian cavalry previously, and should not have risked advancing in open plains where the opponent's cavalry was also present.

Accounts of individuals

Herodotus recounts several anecdotes about the conduct of specific Spartans during the battle.

• Amompharetus: The leader of a battalion (lochos) of Spartans (specifically Pitanates), he refused to undertake the night-time retreat towards Plataea before the battle, because he thought it was cowardly. At dawn, the rest of the Spartan army finally began to retreat, leaving Amompharetus' division behind. Amompharetus eventually led his men to join the retreating Spartans. However, Spartan tradition remembers Amompharetus as winning great renown at Plataea, and it has thus been suggested that Amompharetus, far from being insubordinate, had instead volunteered to guard the rear.
• Aristodemus: The lone Spartan survivor of the Battle of Thermopylae, Aristodemus was branded a coward. Anxious to redeem his name, he charged the Persian lines by himself, but was killed. Although the Spartans agreed that he had redeemed himself, they awarded him no special honour, because he had failed to fight in the disciplined manner expected of a Spartan.
• Callicrates: Considered the "most beautiful man, not among the Spartans only, but in the whole Greek camp", Callicrates was eager to distinguish himself that day as a warrior, but was deprived of the chance by an arrow that pierced him while he was sitting behind his shield.

Aftermath

Main articles: Battle of Mycale and Second Persian invasion of Greece

According to Herodotus, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same day as Plataea. With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would attempt an invasion again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The Spartan hoplites who died were buried in two different graves, while the helots were buried in a third one. Those buried at the first grave were either priests (irees) or "young men in their twenties" (irenes). Pausanias did not permit the desecration of Mardonius' corpse as revenge for the mutilation of Leonidas' body, a proposal put forth by Lampon of Aegina. Pausanias also freed a Coan women, who had been captured and put into concubinage in the Persian camp.

The allied Greek army rested for ten days, then proceeded to siege Thebes and rebuke the city's politicians who had advocated for the Persian cause. Attaginus, the foremost medizing politician, escaped; his sons were pardoned by Pausanias. However, all the other remaining medisers were executed without being tried, because it was believed they would have evaded punishment through bribery. The Spartans did not send any troops for the allied effort after the battle; the historian Marcello Lupi contends that the Spartans did so because they did not have any naval experience, because they believed their soldiers could have been corrupted by the Persians, and because they wanted to solidify their dominance in the Peloponnese. The allied forces were commanded by the Athenians for the remainder of the war.

The remnants of the Persian army, under the command of Artabazos, tried to retreat to Asia Minor. Travelling through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace by the shortest road, Artabazos eventually made it back to the Hellespont, though losing many soldiers to Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger. After the victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. There was a Persian garrison in Sestos, the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege Sestos fell to the Athenians. In Sestos, the medizing general Artayctes was crucified and his son was stoned to death by Xanthippus, an Athenian general. According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great, during his invasion of Persia, had recognized that the victory at Plataea had paved the way for his conquest.

Spoils

The Acropolis of Athens, where the Athenian share of the Persian spoils may have been stored.

The cuirass armor of Masistius, the Persian cavalry commander, was displayed at the shrine of Athena Polias in the Erechtheion, located in the Acropolis complex in Athens, and was still to be found at the same location in the 2nd century AD. The geographer Pausanias had also seen a sword, said to be Mardonius' acinaces, in the Acropolis. The manger of Mardonius' horse, fabricated in bronze and captured by the Tegeans, was gifted to the Temple of Athena Alea in Tegea. The loot pillaged from the Persians was sold to fund the construction of multiple buildings, like the Athenian Treasury at Delphi. It is possible that originals, misattributions or replicas of the Persian spoils from Plataea were stored at the Acropolis complex, particularly in the Parthenon.

The historian Irene de Jong argues that the spoils of the Persian wars were instrumental in advancing the Athenian assimilation of Persian culture. She argues that Pausanias had sent the helots, and not the Greek regulars, to collect the loot either because he wanted it to be distributed fairly, or because he wanted most of it for himself. However, the helots did steal some of the loot while collecting the luxury articles and the armor and gear of the fallen Persian soldiers. She argues that the loot was a windfall, composed of riches which were greater than what the Greeks were accustomed to. The loot included tents, couches, vessels, cauldrons, weapons and armor; all of these were fashioned in either gold, silver or bronze. Three artifacts, made of gold and bronze and created from the Persian spoils, were offered to the gods. A tripod was dedicated to Apollo at Delphi, to Zeus at Olympia, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth.

de Jong notes that the Greek soldiers had divided between themselves the "women, horses, talents, camels and yoke animals" captured from the Persian camp. She also notes that the Plataeans would later come about treasure chests in the area. She notes that Herodotus was surprised when the colorful Persian garments, which he was very interested in, were not taken by the Greeks sent to pick up the loot. She notes how Pausanias had, after the battle, asked the Persian and Spartan cooks to prepare meals for him. Observing the difference between the two, and also the luxurious nature of the Persian furniture and decor in Mardonius' tent, he had asked the other Greek commanders to come over. Pausanias then would point out these luxuries and tell them it was absurd for the Persians, who lived luxurious lifestyles, to invade the Greeks, who lived austerely. She argues that this experience had attracted Pausanias to the luxurious Persian lifestyle and might have led to his medism, especially since he had claimed and received a greater share of the loot at Plataea.

One-tenth of all the Persian loot was given to Pausanias and not to the state of Sparta. This disproportionate distribution would have been concerning for the Spartans, especially since Pausanias dedicated none of his spoils to the gods' temples. Herodotus had observed that the gains from Spartan victories could have endangered the very fabric of their society. He had also noted the concerns of the homoioi about the loot from the Persian wars. According to Herodotus, the helots mistakenly sold the gold items to the Aeginetans at the price of bronze, and the latter acquired their wealth because of this.

The historian Caroline Vout argues that the Greek soldiers and generals were reminded to pay the "gods" their due share, which was one-tenth of the total loot, while the rest was distributed among the allied Greek states. She argues that the focus was on the Persian gold, which was melt down to create, among other items, the Delphic Tripod, which later became the Serpent Column. She argues that the battle of Plataea was an anomaly in the sense of the loot it begot, perhaps because Xerxes' royal tent, with its extensive supplies, was retained for Mardonius' stay and later plundered. She further argues that the victories at Plataea and Mycale heralded the Greek incorporation of Persian culture, and also increased the significance assigned to Persian articles.

Legacy

Main article: Serpent Column

Reconstitution of the column.

The Serpent Column dedicated by the victorious Greeks, located in Istanbul, formerly Constantinople

A bronze column in the shape of intertwined snakes, the Serpent Column, was created from melted-down Persian armor, acquired during the plunder of the Persian camp, and was erected at Delphi. It commemorated all the Greek city-states that had participated in the battle, listing them on the column. Most of it still survives in the Hippodrome of Constantinople in present-day Istanbul, where it was carried by Constantine the Great during the founding of his city on the Greek colony of Byzantium.

The poet Simonides of Ceos was instrumental in commemorating the victory at Plataea; he wrote an encomium and an elegy about the battle. The historian Marcello Lupi contends that these texts were commissioned by the Spartans, possibly by Pausanias, since they glorify both. In Spartan propaganda, the victory at Plataea was seen as having avenged the Spartan defeat at Thermopylai. After the battle, the Athenian commander Aristides proposed the commencement of a festival dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios, the Eleutheria, in order to honor the Greeks who had died during the battle.

Analysis

The historian Roel Konijnendijk argues that technological advantages, if these existed, were not among the reasons for the Greek victory over the Persians at Plataea. He argues that there were multiple other reasons for the outcome of the battle. He claims that the Persians' iron cuirass armor would have been of better quality than the Greek bronze cuirass armor. Konijnendijk states that only some soldiers of both armies would have worn armor, and that their numbers would not have been greater than 10%. He thus postulates that the Greeks did not have better armor than the Persians. He argues that it was not the Greeks but the Persian soldiers who were "uniformly trained and equipped for close combat". He claims that the Persian shield wall was the Greeks' target during the early clashes, and that the Persian Immortals had kept fighting even after the shield wall broke, but stopped after their commander Mardonius was killed. He also notes that the Spartans were the only experienced and skilled soldiers in the Greek camp, and that all the other Greek soldiers were amateurs.

Konijnendijk notes the dominance of the Persian cavalry over the Greek infantry, and how the former had initiated the battle at Plataea. He argues that these cavaliers could fire arrows and javelins at the Greeks without coming within the range of the latter's spears; and that the Persian infantry inflicted much damage on the Spartans, who did not have long-range weapons to counter and defend themselves. He also observes how the Persians used their archers for area denial by putting the banks of the Asopos river within their arrows' range and thus cutting off the Greeks' source of fresh water. Konijnendijk argues that the Greeks would have lost at Plataea if their army had been all hoplites, and that the light infantry missileers, who were two-thirds of the Greek army, could counter the Persians' long-range weapons more effectively. He argues that these missileers would have sought cover behind the hoplite shields at Plataea. He argues that Pausanias knew the hoplites were weaker in such a scenario and that archers were needed.

Greek hoplite and Persian warrior depicted fighting on an ancient kylix (cup). Fifth century BC

Konijnendijk notes that the Greeks had sent hoplites and archers for the first few skirmishes, and that the archers had managed to turn these into a pitched battle by injuring the Persian commander's horse. He argues that the Persians had advantages in mobility, range, flexibility and lethality over the Greeks. He argues that the Persians could have outflanked the Greeks easily, but they did not because they actually did not outnumber the Greeks by a lot. He also argues that Mardonius normally would not have proposed a duel of champions between the Persian Immortals and Greek hoplites because it would have reduced his numerical advantage. Konijnendijk argues that Mardonius had proposed the duel because he wanted to reduce the Greeks' numbers, and postulates that the Greeks may have been the ones who outnumbered the Persians, since the latter feared the size of the former's army. Konijendjik argues that the Persian strategy was to pursue a lengthened war and thus force a Greek retreat, since the latter had limited access to supplies and water. He argues that the Greek strategy was to pull the Persians into a pitched battle, because the former were logistically constrained with regards to managing their large army for long, and because they might have believed the terrain was advantageous for them.

Konijnendijk argues that both the Greeks and Persians had depleted their supplies before the final battle. Mardonius may have decided on attacking first because the Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Mycale would have threatened his line of communications and routes for retreating. He argues that the Persians lost the battle because they did not deploy their cavalry fully in the final battle, and also because their morale had shattered after Mardonius' death. He further argues that the Greeks did not win because of presumed technological superiority, but because of their consistent refusal to break and their sustained strong morale.

Konijnendijk and historian Paul M. Bardunias observe that Plataea was the first battle since Thermopylai and the last battle ever where the Persian Immortals fought the Spartan hoplites. They argue that multiple features of a typical hoplite battle are missing in Herodotus' narrative of Plataea, however, later authors assumed they were. They argue that the general narrative of Plataea as a phalanx battle is contrary to the evidence. They note that Herodotus had provided any details about the depth of the Greek ranks at Plataea, but had written about the greater depth of the Persian ranks. They thus argue that the Greek forces at Plataea were not arrayed in grids, and did not fight in the manner of Classical hoplite phalanxes. They note that the Spartans at Plataea did not execute the movements attributed to them by later authors like Xenophon.

Konijnendijk and Bardunias argue that the helots were indeed deployed along with the other Spartans during the final battle, and were not auxiliaries. They argue that the Spartan formation could not have been eight ranks deep with one hoplite in front and seven light infantry to the rear. They argue that such a line would have been 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) long, which would not be possible on Plataea's terrain, and the Persian Immortals would not have been able to create a similarly long line. They note that the Spartan phalanxes were eight ranks deep in only one instance in recorded history. They argue that the Greeks had formed a defensive line during the final battle, and would send small groups out to provoke the Persians into breaking their formations, and only then would they start pushing like Classical hoplite phalanxes. They argue that the Greeks would not have formed tight phalanxes, and instead would have kept some distance between each soldier to allow individual soldiers to attack.

A typical Persian formation, ten ranks deep with sparabara (heavy infantry) in front, eight archers in the middle and a supervisor at the back.

Konijnendijk and Bardunias note that the Spartans may have arranged their units according to their syssitia (meal groups). They argue that the Spartan line would have had a depth of four ranks, with some columns on the line having greater depth, arrayed in a "rough formation". They posit that the Persians lost because of overspecialization. They postulate that Plataea was a battle of shield walls, where the Greeks won because their shield wall was capable of movement, sending out skirmishers and moving in on their opponent. The Persian shield wall, on the other hand, was better for shielding archers, missileers and cavalry. They observe that the sparabara (heavy infantry) were the only Persians who could face off against the hoplites in close quarters, and when the former were defeated, the outmatched light infantry had to fight the hoplites. They note that the Persians could not retreat quickly, and their cavalry, which could have assaulted the Greek flanks, did not engage, perhaps because of adverse terrain. The battle of shield walls at Plataea, according to them, was a phase in the development of Greek combat, where it morphed from "fluid" combat in Archaic Greece into Classical hoplite phalanxes.

The historian George Cawkwell argues that the Greek inactivity during the first 10 days of the battle did not reflect well on their commander Pausanias. He further argues that all the Greek generals had had no hopes of victory before the final battle commenced. He argues that the Persians' continuous cavalry attacks had been successful, and thus Mardonius' decision to go on the offensive with all of his troops is puzzling. He claims that Mardonius' decision to use all of his cavalry for a charge indicates that the Persians would anyways have attacked the Greeks, even if they had not known the latter were going to retreat or move their camps. Cawkwell argues that the reason for the Persian attack had been a shortage of supplies, since their food stocks were going to run out in a few days, which was also why Artabazos had advocated for retreating to Thebes.

Cawkwell argues that the major lesson of Plataea was the reinforcement of the superiority of the hoplite over Persian light infantry. After the Greco-Persian Wars, the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. Cawkwell argues that after the battle the Persians started to deploy their cavalry in front of their infantry, while previously they would deploy their cavalry at the center and the flanks of their infantry. Cawkwell further claims that the Persians had developed their Cardaces infantry corps as their counter to Greek infantry. Cawkwell also argues that Greece, which could have been a new Persian satrapy, was lost due to the defeat at Plataea, and not due to the defeat at Salamis.

Andreas Konecny argues that the phalanx formed by all the hoplites would have been 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) long if there were 8 men per column. He argues that all the Spartan helots may not have been deployed on the battlefield, because the 35,000 helots in the seven rows to the back plus the 5,000 Spartiates in the front would have made the phalanx 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) long. Konecny argues that the Greek position near Mount Cithaeron had been very well suited for defence, but they could not have defeated the Persians without fighting a pitched battle. According to Konecny, two of the reasons that the Greeks would have had to fight a pitched battle was because their phalanx armies were not suitable for a war of attrition or maneuver warfare, which the Persian invasion would have transformed into; and because they did not have the required logistical support. Konecny argues that if the Greeks hadn't fought a pitched battle, the Greek alliance would have broken apart after entering its third year.

Konecny argues that there would have been large contingents of non-combatants in the Persian camps. He argues that their presence would have led to the size of Mardonius' army being inflated. Konecny also claims that the Greeks did not have any strategic plans during the retreat, and were instead making tactical movements to avoid being defeated. He further argues that the Greek commanders did not protect their supply lines or routes for retreating. Konecny argues that after learning of the Greek retreat, Mardonius would have hurried with the Persian left wing in order to pull ahead of the Greek rear and attack them, since he might have thought that the Greeks had not formed their phalanx yet. Konecny cites Herodotus to observe that these Persians under Mardonius were not in formation, while the Greeks under Pausanias were.

The Greek casualties at Plataea were 652 according to Herodotus, 1360 according to Plutarch and 10,000 according to Diodorus. Konecny notes that the second estimate would have indicated a casualty rate of 4% for the Greeks. Konecny argues that if Mardonius had executed a proper systematic attack or if Artabazos had reinforced him earlier, the Persians might have won, or at least suffered fewer casualties. Konecny further claims that had the Persians not chased the Greeks after their retreat to the "island", the alliance of the latter would have eventually broken up.

According to historian John Francis Lazenby, the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon in some ways; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other. The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well-defended positions. Lazenby argued that Mardonius' actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an aggressive policy. He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle, but as attempts to force them to retreat. Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart, as it nearly had during the previous winter season.

Bibliography

Ancient sources

• Herodotus. The Histories. Archived from the original on 11 August 2024.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)

Modern sources

Research papers and theses

• Jones, Robert Thomas (2020). The prospect of reconstructing ancient battlefields in the 21st Century: a case study using the Battle of Plataea (479 B.C.E.) (PhD thesis). University of Newcastle. hdl:1959.13/1410875.
• Konijnendijk, Roel (2012). "'Neither the less valorous nor the weaker': Persian military might and the battle of Plataia". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 61 (10): 1–17. doi:10.25162/historia-2012-0001. hdl:1887/66873. JSTOR 41342866.
• Mozhajsky, Andrej (2017). "Reconsidering the Movement of Pausanias' Army Before the Battle of Plataiai in 479 BC". Revue internationale d'histoire militaire ancienne. 5: 33–50. ISBN 9782252041123.
• Müller, Christel (2024). "Plataean Remembrances: The Monuments of the Battle from the Imperial Period [and] Backwards". Classica Et Mediaevalia. Supplement 1: 17–42. doi:10.7146/classicaetmediaevalia.vi1.145227.

Books

• Burn, Andrew Robert (1966). The Pelican History of Greece. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780140207927.
• Cawkwell, George (2005). The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198148715.001.0001. ISBN 9780198148715.
• Connolly, Peter (2012). Greece and Rome at War. Frontline Books. ISBN 9781848326095.
• de Jong, Irene J. F.; Versluys, Miguel John, eds. (2024). Reading Greek and Hellenistic-Roman Spolia: Objects, Appropriation and Cultural Change. Euhormos: Greco-Roman Studies in Anchoring Innovation. Vol. 5. Brill. doi:10.1163/9789004682702. ISBN 978-90-04-68270-2.
  • de Jong, Irene J. F. "Herodotus’ Framing of the Persian Spolia at Plataea". In de Jong & Versluys (2024), pp. 71–86.
  • van Rookhuijzen, Janric. "Herodotus and the Persian Spoils on the Acropolis of Athens". In de Jong & Versluys (2024), pp. 87–107.
  • Vout, Caroline. "‘Spolia’ as Category: Greek and Roman Perspectives". In de Jong & Versluys (2024), pp. 265–283.
• Delbrück, Hans (1990). Medieval Warfare. History of the Art of War. Vol. 3. Translated by Renfroe Jr., Walter J. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 9780803265851.
• Fehling, Detlev (1971). Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot: Studien zur Erzählkunst Herodots [The Sources of Herodotus: Studies of Herodotus' Narrative Art]. Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte [Studies in Ancient Literature and History] (in German). Vol. 9. De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110841930. ISBN 9783110036343.
• Flower, Michael A.; Marincola, John (2002). Herodotus. Histories Book IX. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521596503.
• Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. University of California Press. doi:10.1525/9780520917064. ISBN 9780520203136.
• Konecny, Andreas (2017). "Masistios (Hdt. 9, 20-25). Der persische Reiterangriff auf die erste Position der Griechen bei Plataiai" [Masistios (Hdt. 9, 20-25). The Persian cavalry attack on the first position of the Greeks in Plataea]. Havva İşkan’a Armağan. LYKIARKHISSA: Festschrift für Havva İşkan [A Gift to Havva İşkan. LYKIARKHISSA: Festschrift for Havva İşkan.]. Ege Yayınları. pp. 519–532. ISBN 978-605-9680-26-4.
• Konecny, Andreas; Sekunda, Nicholas (2022). The Battle of Plataiai 479 BC. Phoibos Verlag. ISBN 9783851612714.
  • Gaebel, Robert. "The Boiotian Cavalry". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 243–248.
  • Konecny, Andreas. "The Battle of Plataeiai. Topography and Tactics". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 167–210.
  • Konijnendijk, Roel; Bardunias, Paul M. "The Face of Battle at Plataiai". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 211–242.
  • Macgregor-Morris, Ian (2022a). "Pausanias, Best of Men: Politics, Propaganda, and Memory". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 79–132.
  • Macgregor-Morris, Ian (2022b). "Aristeides the Just?". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 133–152.
  • Sekunda, Nicholas. "Greek Logistics at Plataiaei and Strategical Planning during the Third Invasion of Greece (480 – 479 BC)". In Konecny & Sekunda (2022), pp. 153–166.
• Lazenby, John Francis (1993). The Defence of Greece, 490-479 B.C. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 9780856685910.
• Lupi, Marcello (2017). "Sparta and the Persian Wars, 499–478". In Powell, Anton (ed.). A Companion to Sparta. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 269–290. doi:10.1002/9781119072379.ch10. ISBN 9781405188692.
• Millender, Ellen (2024). "The Perils of Victory: Sparta's Uneasy Relationship with the Profits of War". In Rosenbloom, David; Pomeroy, Arthur J.; Armstrong, Jeremy (eds.). Money, warfare and power in the ancient world: studies in honour of Matthew Freeman. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 73–104. ISBN 978-1-3502-8377-0.
• Roisman, Joseph; Worthington, Ian (2011). A Companion to Ancient Macedonia. Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World. John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781444327519. ISBN 9781444351637.
• Shepherd, William (2012). Plataea 479 BC: The most glorious victory ever seen. Osprey Campaign Series. Vol. 239. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781849085540.

External links

• Livius Picture Archive: the battle of Plataea (479 BC). Livius.org.
• Mardonius and the battle of Plataea. Livius.org. Archived 2014-03-06 at the Wayback Machine.